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ABSTRACT 
 
Does democracy reduce corruption? While much recent research has focused on the ability of citi-
zens in democracies to hold politicians accountable through regular elections, other institutional 
features of democracy such as a free press and independent civil society may also strengthen ac-
countability by lowering the costs of monitoring and sanctioning malfeasance. Using an original 
dataset of high-profile corruption cases across 154 countries, I find a strong positive relationship 
between democratic institutions and anti-corruption enforcement. Moreover, this relationship ob-
tains after restricting attention to states without free and fair elections, suggesting that even in 
countries where citizens cannot reliably exercise accountability through the ballot, liberalization of 
the civic sphere can help hold malfeasance in check. 
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Introduction
Does democracy reduce corruption? In recent years, this question has been a topic of much debate,
mostly focusing on the interaction between democratic citizens and their elected oﬃcials. On the
one hand, democracy has been posited to reduce corruption and political malfeasance by providing
citizens with both the information and the means to hold politicians accountable through periodic
elections (Adserà, Boix and Payne, 2003; Brunetti andWeder, 2003; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Persson,
Tabellini and Trebbi, 2003). On the other hand, studies have shown that voters do not always punish
corrupt politicians at the polls (Ackerman, 2005; Chang, Golden and Hill, 2010; Chong et al., 2015;
Eggers, 2014; Klašnja and Tucker, 2013; Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2012; Wantchekon, 2003),
and electoral competition may even encourage the proliferation of corrupt practices by driving
up the demand for illicit campaign donations (Golden and Chang, 2001; Montinola and Jackman,
2002; Rock, 2009). In short, it remains an open question whether democracy reduces corruption by
strengthening accountability through electoral channels.
However, in focusing on electoral accountability, the literature has largely ignored alternative av-
enues by which democratic systems may hold corruption in check. In this paper, I consider whether
democracy may help in the fight against corruption by strengthening accountability across govern-
ment agencies. In particular, I focus on the activities of the judiciary and other government bodies
(e.g. prosecutors, anti-corruption agencies, ombudsmen, legislative ethics commissions) charged
with monitoring and sanctioning corrupt behavior. Such intra-governmental oversight has often
been referred to as horizontal accountability, to be distinguished from the vertical (i.e. electoral)
accountability exercised by voters (Grimes, 2013; O’Donnell, 2001). Compared to vertical account-
ability, horizontal accountability is likely to be more eﬀective in deterring corruption, as it directly
targets both elected politicians and bureaucratic oﬃcials, and its operation is not restricted to
election periods (Grimes, 2013).1
I hypothesize that democratic institutions can strengthen horizontal accountability through several
mechanisms. Here, I focus in particular on the liberal components of democracy, as embodied by
a free press and independent civil society. These institutions fulfill an important “fire alarm” func-
tion in democratic systems by uncovering and publicizing wrongdoing, thereby alerting enforcement
bodies to incidences of abuse and triggering formal investigations and sanctions. In addition, the
attention of the media and civil society groups may increase the pressure on oversight agencies to
“do something” about corruption, while simultaneously insulating them from political interference
in unwelcome cases (Grimes, 2013; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000). In transactional terms, these
features of democratic systems should reduce the costs to law enforcement of monitoring and sanc-
1In addition, when the state itself is seen as actively taking a stand against corruption, this may send the message that
malfeasance is no longer the “norm” (Manion, 2009), and thereby reduce the moral justifiability of such behavior.
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tioning the abuse of oﬃce. As a result, we should observe a positive relationship between media
and civil society freedom and anti-corruption enforcement ceteris paribus.
Empirically, I examine this prediction using an original dataset measuring horizontal accountabil-
ity constructed from qualitative information on high-profile corruption cases covering 154 countries
over the period 2004-2014. I show that my accountability measure is meaningfully correlated with
perceived corruption levels across countries, and that countries with greater media and civil society
freedom also exhibit higher levels of anti-corruption activity. The link between democratic institu-
tions and horizontal accountability is robust to the inclusion of controls for possible confounding
variables, as well as to alternative modeling assumptions. Finally, the same conclusions apply even
after dropping “electoral” democracies from the estimation. These last results suggest that, even
in countries where citizens cannot reliably exercise accountability through the ballot (Bauhr and
Grimes, 2014; Klašnja and Tucker, 2013), greater media and civil society freedom can nonetheless
support mechanisms of horizontal oversight that help hold corruption in check.
This paper makes three contributions to research on democracy and corruption. First, in contrast
to much of the debate over whether democracy can strengthen accountability through elections,
I highlight the importance of intra-governmental oversight in the fight against corruption, and
further link accountability outcomes to features of liberal democratic systems. This research is
amongst the first to address the specific question of why political systems vary in terms of the
eﬀectiveness of anti-corruption enforcement (c.f. Alt and Lassen, 2008, 2014; van Aaken, Feld and
Voigt, 2010). Secondly, my results demonstrate the importance of considering substantive aspects
of democracy apart from elections. While elections provide one means of keeping malfeasance in
check, this paper highlights how components of liberal democracy related to press and civil society
freedom can support accountability through non-electoral channels. Finally, I introduce what is, to
my knowledge, the only extant dataset measuring horizontal accountability across countries. This
dataset has the potential to open up new avenues of research by allowing scholars to directly test
arguments about the causes and consequences of anti-corruption control.
In the next section, I review the existing literature to draw out some testable hypotheses linking
institutional features of democratic systems to greater horizontal accountability. Afterwards, I
introduce my original dataset of anti-corruption enforcement, and describe the construction of the
dependent variable. I also discuss the explanatory and control variables used in the analysis to follow.
Finally, I present my estimation results and robustness checks, and conclude with a discussion of
contributions and directions for future research.
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Related Literature
Given growing recognition of the social, economic and political costs of corruption, the past three
decades have witnessed an explosion of interest in the issue of corruption control. The intellec-
tual foundation animating many anti-corruption eﬀorts builds upon the logic of principal-agent
theory (Klitgaard, 1988; Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2012; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Under this
model, principals (citizens or rulers) delegate some task (providing public services) to agents (pub-
lic oﬃcials), but agents also have incentives and opportunities to abuse their discretion for private
gain. Anti-corruption eﬀorts aim to curb such (mis-)behavior by reducing information asymme-
tries between principals and agents and / or increasing the severity of sanctions, thereby deterring
corruption at the margin (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).
Responsibility for monitoring abuses and imposing sanctions lies in the hands of formals agencies
such as prosecutors, courts and anti-corruption commissions with formal powers of law enforcement
(O’Donnell, 2001). However, there is enormous variation in the capacity of these agencies to exercise
their monitoring and sanctioning powers. Evidence suggests that the eﬀectiveness of oversight
institutions depends critically upon the skills and numbers of their staﬀ and the material resources
at their disposal (Alt and Lassen, 2014), as well as the degree of independence enjoyed by prosecutors
and judges (Alt and Lassen, 2008; van Aaken, Feld and Voigt, 2010).
These last results shed light on the fact that, in executing their powers of oversight, law enforce-
ment oﬃcials are subject to a number of transactions costs. First, as many scholars have noted,
law enforcement authorities often have inadequate time and resources to investigate all potential
instances of malfeasance (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). As a result,
much corruption may simply go undetected.2
A second type of cost involves political interference in investigative, prosecutorial and judicial proce-
dures. More specifically, when the career prospects of police oﬃcers, prosecutors and judges depend
upon other political actors, law enforcement oﬃcials may shy away from vigorously pursuing “sen-
sitive cases” for fear of oﬀending powerful interests. Such retaliation can range from reductions in
salary to demotion and even termination of employment (van Aaken, Feld and Voigt, 2010). In
addition, overly-zealous investigations may result in weakened legal mandates or a sudden with-
drawal of institutional resources (Lawson, 2009; Wrong, 2010). In sum, the potential for political
interference can significantly erode the eﬀectiveness of horizontal accountability.
Keeping these costs in mind, the literature also suggests ways in which democratic institutions
can support the capacity of oversight agencies. Here, I focus in particular on features of liberal
2This is likely to be especially true in cases of collusive corruption where both parties benefit from the transaction
and therefore have strong incentives to keep quiet. By contrast, in cases of extortive corruption, the injured party
has some incentive to report the abuse, although “blowing the whistle” remains costly.
5
democracy associated with a free press and independent civil society, as both of these institutions
have their own incentives to engage in the fight against corruption. In the media’s case, market
competition and the desire to “tell a good tale” push news outlets towards investigative reporting that
uncovers and publicizes incidences of abuse. With respect to civil society, anti-corruption NGOs
such Transparency International serve as platforms to unite concerned citizens, and can further
motivate engagement by building awareness, coordinating civic activities, and resolving collective
action problems (Grimes, 2013).
One important role played by these institutions involves the sounding of “fire alarms” to expose
corruption and provide evidence against wrongdoers (Adserà, Boix and Payne, 2003; Brunetti and
Weder, 2003; Freille, Haque and Kneller, 2007; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000). For example, the
downfall of Austrian MEP Ernst Strasser resulted directly from an undercover “sting” operation
conducted by journalists from Britain’s Sunday Times newspaper, who caught Strasser on camera
oﬀering to amend European legislation in exchange bribes. Civil society groups have also played
an important role in both reporting illicit behavior directly to law enforcement (Manion, 2009),
and acting as “parallel auditors” of government service provision. As a result of these activities,
law enforcement agencies are able to gather evidence much more cheaply, and therefore bear fewer
monitoring costs.
Secondly, with respect to the threat of retaliation, a free media and civil society can significantly raise
the costs of political interference by creating visibility and mobilizing citizens in support of the rule of
law. Even powerful political actors will think twice about quashing unwelcome cases when the media
and civil society NGOs have engaged the public’s attention.3 For instance, Grimes (2013) recounts
how the prosecuting authority in a Brazilian municipality leveraged civil society support to defend
itself against political meddling in its investigations of widespread administrative corruption. By the
same token, public scrutiny may also increase the costs of institutional inaction. For example, recent
popular protests in Guatemala upped the incentives for lawmakers to lift prosecutorial immunity
for President Otto Pérez Molina, who was subsequently ordered to stand trial on a multitude of
charges linked to a wide-ranging customs scam. These examples show how, by focusing a spotlight
on law enforcement and the judicial process, media and civil society organizations can counter the
temptation to cover up instances of wrongdoing, and provide investigators, prosecutors and judges
with both the incentives as well as the necessary “breathing room” to act.
In summary, these considerations imply that features of liberal democracy associated with media
and civil society freedom should reduce the transactions costs facing formal oversight agencies.
We should therefore observe higher levels of anti-corruption activity in democratic settings. These
3In electoral democracies, these costs can include the destruction of public oﬃcials’ political capital and reputations,
which can have consequences politicians’ future job prospects (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000). However, even in
autocracies, public oﬃcials may face substantial “audience costs” if they are seen to be abetting corruption (Gillespie
and Okruhlik, 1991; Lawson, 2009).
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arguments are consistent with existing empirical studies of the relationship between the media, civil
society and country corruption levels. For example, Adserà, Boix and Payne (2003) and Brunetti and
Weder (2003) show that lower (perceived) corruption exists in countries with (a) wider circulation of
newspapers per capita and (b) better Freedom House “press freedom” scores, respectively. Similarly,
Grimes (2013) finds that the density of civil society organizations is positively associated with
better governance outcomes, and that this eﬀect is driven by countries with supportive democratic
institutions.
The present paper contributes to this body of work in two ways. First, with few exceptions (c.f.
Grimes, 2013; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000), much of the literature focuses on the media and
civil society’s role in fostering electoral accountability by providing citizens with the information
and organization necessary to identify and punish corrupt politicians at the polls (Adserà, Boix and
Payne, 2003; Chang, Golden and Hill, 2010; Chong et al., 2015; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Treisman,
2000; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). By contrast, I highlight how these institutions can also
support horizontal accountability by serving as vital “fire alarms” and “political buﬀers.”
Secondly, existing cross-national research relies mostly upon empirical models using perceptions-
based measures of corruption as the dependent variable. In these cases, scholars are left to infer the
level of accountability from perceived corruption outcomes. However, the level of corruption may be
determined by a variety of factors including economic growth, political culture, etc., and therefore
provides only a very poor proxy of accountability. The present study addresses this problem by
introducing a direct measure of the dependent variable of interest - horizontal accountability - in
order to precisely test the proposition that media and civil society freedom is associated with more
active formal investigation and prosecution of wrongdoing.
Data Description
Anti-Corruption Enforcement
In this section, I present my strategy for measuring the level of intra-governmental enforcement
activity. Conceptually, this variable can be operationalized as some function of either (a) the
number of implicated corrupt oﬃcials, or (b) the number of formal corruption cases. The first
quantity is important for estimating the capture rate, or the percentage of all corrupt individuals
who are punished, while the second ratio is related to the audit rate, or the chance of being caught
for any single act of malfeasance. While the audit rate is arguably a cleaner indicator of deterrence, I
operationalize the enforcement level in relation to the capture rate for reasons described below.
To measure the number of implicated oﬃcials, I begin with Freedom House’s Freedom in the World
(FITW) reports covering 154 countries over the period 2004-2014. These reports provide qualitative
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information on developments pertaining to political rights and civil liberties within each country
during the previous calendar year. Importantly for my purposes, the FITW reports also contain a
paragraph or section (organized in recent years under the heading “Functioning of Government")
describing problems with corruption within the country, as well as any anti-corruption eﬀorts that
the country has undertaken. This qualitative information serves as the raw material for my coding
of enforcement activity.
As with any eﬀort to transform qualitative information into quantitative data, the researcher is faced
with a series of choices and tradeoﬀs in defining an appropriate coding scheme. Below, I describe
my coding criteria in detail, providing examples where necessary, so that the choices I have made
are as transparent as possible. Readers can then decide for themselves whether they are convinced
about my operationalization of the dependent variable. Furthermore, this description can also serve
as a basis for replication, amendment or extension of the dataset in future work.
As a threshold question, since my theory concerns the relationship between features of democracy
and the extent to which the authorities are taking action against corruption, we must first define
the set of institutions to be included within “the authorities.” While the FITW reports contain
information about accountability arising from a plethora of sources (e.g. cases where private in-
dividuals expose wrongdoing), here I am primarily concerned with intra-governmental oversight.
Thus, a case is only counted if a formal public body (e.g. a prosecutor, a parliamentary committee,
a court, police) initiates some sort of action against the target of the allegation.
In principle, we can also diﬀerentiate amongst diﬀerent outcomes ranging from investigations to
indictments to prison sentences. Along this spectrum, a jail sentence clearly sends a much stronger
signal about the strength of oversight mechanisms compared to a preliminary investigation, and we
may wish to code this distinction. However, in practice, the FITW reports often do not follow a
case to its final disposition.4 An even greater complication is introduced by the fact that judicial
processes can often drag on over an extended period of time, as cases are opened, dropped, and
then re-opened with the discovery of new evidence, convictions are appealed and overturned, and
prison sentences are commuted. Thus, even if the FITW reports did follow the same case over
from its inception to the present, we can still never know the case’s “final” disposition. Rather,
in the majority of instances, the FITW reports only provide a snapshot of enforcement eﬀorts at
a given point in time. For these reasons, I eschew providing a more detailed coding of the exact
“level” of accountability. Instead, a case enters the dataset if any formal action - ranging from police
investigations all the way up to prison sentences - is mentioned.
4For example, the 2011 report on the United States notes that former Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich was convicted
on multiple counts of corruption related to his attempt to sell Barack Obama’s vacant Senate seat, but fails to mention
his 14-year prison sentence imposed later that year.
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Third, I focus on enforcement actions taken against public oﬃcials (i.e. politicians and bureaucrats).
Investigations and prosecutions of private businessmen and companies are not counted, unless they
are linked to a public oﬃcial. In practice, this leaves out cases where (mostly) European and
American companies are sanctioned for bribing foreign leaders. For example, when former Costa
Rican President Rafael Ángel Calderón was convicted for taking $800,000 in bribes from the Finnish
firm Instrumentarium, this incident is coded as a 1 for Costa Rica and a 0 for Finland, even though
the Finnish government initiated a formal investigation of the embezzlement scandal.
A fourth concern is to ensure that cases are roughly comparable across countries in terms of the
importance of the individuals who are targeted. For example, suppose that Country X arrests 100
university professors for taking bribes in exchange for doctoring exam grades, while Country Y
arrests the sitting president for stealing millions from the state pension scheme. Should we count
Country X as having experienced 100 enforcement events, compared to a single event in Country
Y? Clearly, our intuition is that the capture of a “big fish” is more important than the punishment
of “small fry,” but how should we operationalize this distinction?
One solution may be to code perpetrators based on their formal titles, and then weight each case by
how highly perpetrators are placed within the governmental food chain. However, the practicality
of this solution depends upon attaching the appropriate weights to each position, and this process
can become quite muddy. For example, how should we weight, say, the Education Minister against
the mayor of a major metropolitan area, who might also be a prominent member of one of the
main political parties (compare: Arne Duncan vs. New York city mayor Rudy Giuliani)? As these
examples illustrate, even if we had detailed country knowledge for all 154 countries in the dataset,
we might still have no clear intuition as to who counts as the big(ger) fish.
One practical way around this problem is to simply count any target of an enforcement action who
is mentioned by proper name in the FITW reports. The logic behind this coding rule is that “small
fry” are just statistics (e.g. “three government ministers”), but “big fish” (e.g. Rudy Giuliani) have
specific names. In eﬀect, this coding rule increases the comparability of observations in the dataset
by restricting attention to high-profile culprits. Substantively, this restriction might also provide a
“cleaner” measure of accountability, since agencies that are able to take action in high-level cases
are arguably sending a stronger signal of their seriousness in fighting corruption.
Having just stated the “proper name” rule, I make an immediate exception: specifically, I include
cases in the dataset involving multiple unnamed defendants if a scandal has become so iconic in
the popular mind that the case itself has taken on a proper name. Examples include the “Anglo-
Leasing” scandal in Kenya, which involved several senior members of President Mwai Kabaki’s
government, and the Marbella trials in Spain, which have been dubbed the country’s “biggest ever”
corruption trials. These cases are so prominent that (I suspect) the only reason the FITW report
does not name any individual is because the report’s author has decided to use the popular umbrella
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Table 1: Summary of Coding Rules
Rule Description
Formal Authorities Rule The anti-corruption action must be taken by a formal pub-
lic body (e.g. a prosecutor, a parliamentary committee,
a court, police). Actions taken by media, private or non-
governmental institutions (e.g. an NGO initiates an investi-
gation) do not count.
Accountability Equivalence Rule Any formal action taken by one of the above bodies is
counted equivalently. No distinction is made between diﬀer-
ent “levels” of accountability (e.g. preliminary investigations
vs. indictments vs. convictions).
Public Oﬃcial Rule Only oﬀenses committed by a country’s public oﬃcials are
counted towards that country’s total. Oﬀenses committed
by private businessmen and / or firms (often in the course
of bribing foreign oﬃcials) are omitted.
Proper Name Rule Only those events where the defendant or perpetrator is
specifically named are counted (e.g. cases involving “three
government ministers” without further identifying informa-
tion about the defendants are not counted).
Exception: Proper Names Cases involving large-scale scandals (e.g. “Anglo-Leasing" or
“Marbella") are exempt from the Proper Name Rule, even if
no defendant is specifically identified by name.
No Multiple Cases Rule Multiple cases or indictments against a single named defen-
dant are collapsed and counted as a singular instance of the
imposition of horizontal accountability.
moniker instead. In practice, since these cases often involve multiple individuals who would have
been named (and therefore counted as separate observations in the dataset), the inclusion of these
cases is likely to introduce a downward bias in the count of implicated individuals. In the analysis
below, I estimate alternative models with and without the inclusion of these “multiple individual”
cases.
A final issue concerns how to treat multiple cases involving the same person. For example, Italian
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has been involved in over 20 legal cases during his political career.
In principle, we might think that it would be desirable to count each case as a separate “enforcement
event,” as opposed to counting Berlusconi as a single “implicated individual.” This brings us back to
the question of whether we want to operationalize the audit rate or the capture rate. But while we
may think that the audit rate is more desirable as a measure of deterrence, in practice, such multiple
counting becomes impractical, not least because the FITW reports fail to specifically mention the
majority of Berlusconi’s (many) trials. In addition, in a conceptual level, it can become diﬃcult to
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Figure 1: Histogram of Enforcement Against Named Individuals
distinguish each case as truly independent crime, as some cases are clearly linked in terms of the
chain of events, even though separate charges were filed.5
To avoid these issues, I have elected instead to count the number of diﬀerent named individuals in
each country against whom formal action was taken over the period 2004-2014. Conceptually, the
resulting variable captures the degree to which (high-ranking) members of the political class are
exposed to prosecutorial and judicial oversight over the decade. Although the construction of this
measure is undoubtedly sensitive to the series of choices and simplifying assumptions I have made,
it nonetheless provides us with a broad picture of patterns of anti-corruption enforcement across
countries. Table 1 summarizes all of the coding rules just discussed, while the raw case data are
presented in the Online Supplement.
5For example, the long-running perjury trial against Berlusconi and his lawyer David Mills stems from allegations
that the former Italian PM paid Mills $600,000 in 2000 in exchange for providing favorable testimony in two separate
trials against Berlusconi from the late 1990s. In a separate case from 2003, Cesare Previti - another of Berlusconi’s
lawyers - was found guilty of bribing Judge Renato Squillante in order to secure a favorable legal climate in relation
to an earlier case alleging that Berlusconi had (surprise!) bribed judges in the 1980s.
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Across all 154 countries in my sample, the mean number individuals against whom enforcement
action was taken over the decade is 2.27 (sd = 2.99), and the median is 1. As shown in Figure 1, the
distribution is highly skewed with a long right-hand tail. In fact, 53 countries (34% of the sample)
recorded no anti-corruption enforcement over this period, while 34 countries (22% of the sample)
recorded actions taken against four or more individuals, with one country (Indonesia) as the clear
outlier with 22 individuals formally implicated. Appendix A presents the full list of country-level
counts.
Enforcement Activity and Corruption Levels
However, before directly entering this number into our estimations, we must be cognizant of the
fact that the enforcement count is actually the product of two data generating processes. More
specifically, the number of implicated individuals reflects both (a) the vigilance of formal oversight
agencies agencies, as well as (b) the total number of corrupt individuals “available” to be caught.
Thus, a low enforcement count can characterize countries as diﬀerent as Switzerland (where there are
simply few wrongdoers to sanction) and Somalia (where we can safely infer that oversight agencies
are ineﬀective).
This feature of the data can be seen in Figure 2, which graphs the enforcement and country corrup-
tion levels. The x-axis displays estimates of the perceived corruption level within a country provided
by Transparency International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index" (TI), averaged between 2004-2014.
I have reversed the usual scale such that more positive values indicate higher corruption. The y-
axis shows the enforcement counts over the same period. For aesthetic reasons, Indonesia (with its
22 implicated individuals) is not in the picture. From the Figure, we see a clear non-linear, non-
monotonic relationship between enforcement activity and the corruption level within a country: few
individuals face accountability in low corruption countries, as well as in extremely high-corruption
countries, which again supports the contention of two data generating processes.
Since conceptually the aim is to capture only the vigilance of formal oversight agencies, we must
adjust the raw counts to account for the underlying corruption level. In the regressions below,
I therefore control for the country’s TI score as a proxy for the total number of corrupt oﬃcials
“available” to be caught. In this way, I am able to disentangle these two data generating processes
and operationalize the capture rate as a function of the level of enforcement activity.
Explanatory Variables
For my main explanatory variables, I draw upon data from the “Varieties of Democracy" (V-Dem)
project coding various features of democratic institutions (Coppedge et al., 2015). First, to capture
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Figure 2: Enforcement and Country Corruption Levels
the degree of media freedom within a country, I use V-Dem indicators relating to (a) government
censorship of print and broadcast media, (b) harassment of journalists, (c) the extent of media self-
censorship, and (d) the existence of print and broadcast media outlets that criticize the government.6
Next, to measure the independence of civil society organizations, I use the V-dem indicators relating
to (e) the free entry and exit of civil society organizations in public life, and (f) the extent to which
the government represses civil society organizations. All items are scaled such that positive scores
indicate greater independence from the ruling regime.
In principle, variables measuring media and civil society freedom may vary independently, which
would allow us to check the relative importance of each of these mechanisms. However, in practice,
the correlation between the various measures is extremely tight, even though we are measuring
conceptually distinct dimensions of liberal democratic systems. As shown in Table 2, averaging each
variable within countries over the entire decade 2004-2014, every pairwise correlation coeﬃcient is
greater than 0.80, and a factor analysis yields a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.97. In light of this high
6The exact question wordings and answer categories are provided in the Online Supplement.
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Table 2: Correlation between Liberal Democracy Measures
Media Independence Civil Society
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Censor Harass Self-Censor Critical Entry Repress
(a) Censor 1.000
(b) Harass 0.897 1.000
(c) Self-censor 0.898 0.859 1.000
(d) Critical 0.879 0.837 0.908 1.000
(e) Entry 0.831 0.783 0.830 0.844 1.000
(f) Repress 0.882 0.864 0.836 0.822 0.885 1.000
Note: 147 countries. All variables are constructed averaging the yearly V-Dem scores from
2004-2014. In general, year-to-year correlations are extremely high (results not shown).
correlation, I combine all variables into a simple average Liberal Democracy Index (LibDem) which
is standardized to have mean = 0, s.d. = 1.
In addition to the Liberal Democracy Index, I also include a host of control variables in the analyses
below. First, I control for the population size of the country. This control is important because,
holding the corruption level constant, more populous countries may simply contain a greater number
of high-level public oﬃcials, which may yield a higher measure enforcement activity. Moreover, the
FITW Reports may be biased towards more in-depth coverage of more “important” countries. In
particular, as detailed in the methodology section of the report, country information is compiled by
around 90 experts and analysts from the academic, think tank and human rights communities, using
sources such as news articles, academic papers, NGO reports and individual professional contacts.
As the number of countries in the report exceeds the number of experts, it is clear that not every
country is covered by its own set of native analysts. And since non-native experts (and the secondary
sources they consult) are likely to pay more attention to developments in large countries, my dataset
may skew towards counting a greater number of prosecutions in more populous states, simply as an
artifact of the way in which the FITW reports are compiled. To account for both potential sources
of bias, in my analyses below, I control for country population size (logged), using data from the
United Nations population statistics.
Second, I control for some element of state failure. In cases of state failure, countries may not
prosecute corruption because they are too busy trying to contain violence and insurgency within
their borders. In addition, for much the same reasons just described, it may be diﬃcult for FITW
authors to gather corruption-related information in contexts where the state struggles to maintain
order. To the extent that non-democracies are also more insecure, these considerations may also
bias our estimates of the relationship between democracy and accountability. To control for these
potential confounds, I use data from the “security apparatus” subcomponent of the Fund for Peace’s
“Failed States Index." This variable rates states on the extent to which they experience pressures
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related to internal conflict, small arms proliferation, riots and protests, fatalities from conflict,
military coups, rebel activity, militancy, bombings, and political prisoners. Countries are scored on
a scale of 1 - 10 (mean = 5.6, s.d. = 2.4), with higher values indicating greater insecurity.
In addition, I also add controls for “cultural” variables drawn from the literature that may be
correlated with both democratic institutions and stronger horizontal accountability. The first is a
measure of the strength of “traditional” cultural norms that erode the distinction between public
and private spheres, crowding out impersonal “arms-length” relationships with personal and network
solidarities (Banfield, 1958; Olivier De Sardan, 1999; Ekeh, 1975; Geertz, 1973; Husted, 1999; Lipset
and Lenz, 2000; Scott, 1969). In this context, prosecutors and judges may fail to act against corrupt
actors if they believe that legal norms clash with prevailing social norms. Traditional cultural
norms are usually assumed to weaken with (economic) modernization, and thus it is natural to
operationalize this concept using GDP per capita. However, per capita GDP is also highly correlated
with the Transparency International’s corruption measure.7 To minimize multicollinearity, I have
alternatively chosen to use the percentage of rural population as a proxy for “traditionalism,” on the
assumption that urbanization encourages the development of impersonal values. Data are drawn
from Unesco’s Institute for Statistics.
Second and relatedly, the literature has posited that religious traditions may influence the stringency
of anti-corruption enforcement. As noted by Treisman (2000), “Where more ‘hierarchical religions’ -
Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam - dominate, challenges to oﬃce-holders might be rarer than
in cultures shaped by more egalitarian or individualistic religions, such as Protestantism” (p.403).
Accordingly, I control for the percentage of the country’s population that adheres to a “hierarchical
religion," using data taken from (La Porta et al., 1999).
Third, variation in law enforcement activity may diﬀer across legal systems. More specifically,
some “legal cultures” may be more rule-bound than others. For example, Treisman (2000) notes
that,
In Britain and some of its former colonies, scholars have noted an almost obsessive focus
on the procedural aspects of law...By contrast, in many other cultures social order is
associated not so much with adherence to procedures as with respect for hierarchy and
the authority of oﬃces...A willingness of judges to follow procedures even when the
results threaten hierarchy...clearly increases the chance that oﬃcial corruption will be
exposed. (p.403)
To capture this element of legal culture, I control for whether the country in question is a former
British colony, on the assumption that - regardless of the contemporary legal system is based in
the common law or civil law - the legal traditions implanted during the colonial period continue to
7For a discussion of possible reasons, see Treisman (2007).
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influence patterns of judicial practice today. This coding is taken from Hadenius and Teorell (2007).
Appendix B reports the summary statistics for the variables just introduced.
Analysis
To examine the statistical significance of this non-linear relationship, I estimate the following neg-
ative binomial model, which accounts for the fact that the dependent variable consist of count
data:8
Enforcei = ↵+  1LibDemi +  2TIi +⇥Xi + ✏i (1)
where Enforcei represents the count of implicated individuals in country i between 2004 and 2014,
LibDemi represents the country’s standardized media and civil society freedom index score averaged
over the entire decade, TIi represents the country’s average (perceived) corruption level as rated
by Transparency International for the same period, X represents a vector of country-level controls,
and ✏i represents heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
The measure of enforcement activity is robustly and positively correlated with Libdem, conditional
upon the underlying corruption rate (Table 3, model 1). The bivariate relationship between democ-
racy and accountability is roughly linear (Figure 3). The coeﬃcient in model (1) implies that the
increase in democracy scores associated with going from a high-corruption, non-democratic country
like Russia (Libdem = -0.85) to a high-corruption, democratic country like Romania (Libdem =
+0.79) is associated with an increase in 54 log points x 1.64 = 89 log points, or approximately
242 percent, in the enforcement level. To qualitatively illustrate this diﬀerence, while Russian anti-
corruption eﬀorts were mostly targeted at political opponents of the Kremlin such as energy mogul
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Romania managed to convict several powerful politicians during the decade,
including ex-Prime Minister Adrian Naˇstase, the President’s brother (Mircea Baˇsescu), the leader
of a major political party (Dan Voiculescu), and several cabinet ministers.
The coeﬃcient on Libdem is robust to the inclusion of log country population and country inse-
curity (model 2). In addition, both log population and insecurity are significantly correlated with
Enforce in the predicted direction: larger countries record a higher count of implicated oﬃcials,
and accountability appears to be weaker in failed and failing states. In fact, as we might expect,
weak states such Somalia, Chad, CAR, Sudan, DRC, and Iraq record very little enforcement ac-
tivity (see Appendix A). Also note that the inclusion of covariates does not change the coeﬃcient
on Libdem. These results indicate that higher accountability in democratic contexts is not simply
8The Poisson model can be rejected at high levels of confidence because of over-dispersion of the outcome variable
(result not shown).
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Figure 3: Enforcement and Liberal Democracy
an artifact of the fact that the FITW may contain more sparse coverage of corruption events in
smaller, less secure countries.
Models 3 through 7 of Table 3 include controls to test for alternative theories linking cultural or
historical factors to enforcement activity. Here, despite the arguments made in the literature, I find
no support for the link between enforcement and (a) percentage rural of population as a proxy for
modernization, (b) protestant culture, or (c) British legal traditions. The only notable association
is between the percentage of Muslims within the population and lower enforcement, although this
result may simple reflect the fact that countries in the North Africa and Middle East region record
very little anti-corruption activity.
Beyond the inclusion of control variables, I also conduct a series of sensitivity tests (Table 4). Model
1 replicates the main result with a full set of statistically significant controls. Note that, once we
control for the percentage Muslim population, Insecurity is no longer statistically significant at
conventional levels (although it is still correctly signed). As shown in models 2 and 3, the strong
relationship between the anti-corruption enforcement and Libdem is robust to diﬀerent functional
forms: it holds if the dependent variable is estimated using a poisson regression model, as well as an
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Table 3: Country Characteristics and Enforcement Levels, 2004 to 2014
Dependent Variable: Count of Implicated Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LibDem 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.49*** 0.53***
(0.18) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
TI 0.13* 0.23** 0.24*** 0.18 0.23** 0.22** 0.23**
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Pop. (logged) 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.31***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Insecurity -0.13* -0.12* -0.10 -0.13* -0.10 -0.13*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
% Rural -0.23
(0.55)
% Protestant -0.67
(0.62)
% Catholic 0.01
(0.26)
% Muslim -0.61**
(0.31)
British -0.03
(0.21)
Constant -0.00 -4.97*** -4.96*** -4.80*** -4.96*** -4.96*** -4.98***
(0.49) (1.14) (1.15) (1.28) (1.16) (1.19) (1.13)
N 147 146 146 139 141 141 146
Log Likelihood -292.2 -276.9 -276.8 -263.7 -269.9 -268.3 -276.9
R2 0.026 0.068 0.068 0.069 0.067 0.072 0.068
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ordinary least squares specification with log(1+Enforce) as the dependent variable. The results do
not change much if cases involving multiple unnamed individuals (e.g. “Anglo-Leasing”) are dropped
from the sample (model 4), nor if Indonesia (a clear outlier) is excluded (model 5).
Finally, models 6 and 7 address the concern that these results may be the product of an ecological
correlation. More specifically, it could be the case that, compared to the rest of the world, the
group of established “old” democracies in Western Europe and North America have both (a) liberal
democratic institutions and (b) more active anti-corruption enforcement. Thus, the relationship we
observe between Enforce and LibDem in the overall sample may be driven by the fact that this
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Table 4: Country Characteristics and Enforcement Activity: Sensitivity Analysis
Dependent Variable: Count of Implicated Individuals
Negative OLS Negative Negative Negative Negative
Binomial Poisson log(1+Enforce) Binomial Binomial Binomial Binomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LibDem 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.25*** 0.47*** 0.43*** 0.52*** 0.50***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.07) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
TI 0.22** 0.23*** 0.15** 0.24** 0.20** -0.02 0.01
(0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
Pop. (logged) 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.19*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.34*** 0.41***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Insecurity -0.10 -0.09 -0.09* -0.11 -0.10 -0.04 -0.02
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
% Muslim -0.61** -0.43 -0.28 -0.57* -0.69** -0.37 -0.58*
(0.31) (0.32) (0.18) (0.32) (0.31) (0.41) (0.30)
Constant -4.96*** -4.70*** -2.56*** -4.78*** -4.19*** -4.05*** -5.86***
(1.19) (1.42) (0.67) (1.23) (1.10) (1.06) (1.23)
Note: Named Drop Region Drop
Indiv. Indonesia Fixed “Old”
Only (Outlier) Eﬀects Dems
N 141 141 141 141 140 141 113
Log Likelihood -268.3 -310.1 -143.2 -265.1 -262.1 -260.6 -201.6
R2 0.072 0.165 0.236 0.062 0.065 0.099 0.110
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
group of states is simply unique from the rest of the world along both these dimensions, implying that
it is not democratic institutions per se which facilitate greater anti-corruption enforcement.
I examine this issue in two ways. First, column 6 includes fixed eﬀects for world regions.9 Here,
I find that even restricting our attention to variation within world regions, democratic institutions
are still robustly correlated with greater enforcement activity. Secondly, in column 7, I remove the
subset of established democracies from the sample. The coeﬃcient on Democracy remains largely
unchanged. In other words, even amongst autocracies and weakly institutionalized democracies,
those countries that enjoy greater civic freedoms associated with liberal democracy are also more
likely to “take action” against corruption.
9These are: (1) Eastern Europe / CIS, (2) Latin America / Caribbean, (3) North Africa and the Middle East, (4)
Sub-Saharan Africa, (5) Western Europe, North America and Australia, and (6) Asia.
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Figure 4: Liberal Democracy Scores in Countries without Elections
Finally, I consider the extent to which the relationship between democracy on horizontal account-
ability works independently of electoral channel. More specifically, in the subset of countries which
do not hold free and fair elections, is greater media and civil society freedom nonetheless associated
with higher accountability? The logic behind this approach is as follows: although we cannot know
whether citizens will “vote the bums out” if they are oﬀered the chance to participate in competitive
elections, we can be sure that this mechanism is closed oﬀ where elections do not exist. Therefore,
studying the relationship between Enforce and LibDem in this subset of countries can provide a
clean look at whether features of democracy associated with civil society and media freedom can
foster greater horizontal accountability, independently of the electoral channel.
Here, I focus on three recent and widely-cited classifications of electoral democracy provided by
Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012), Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), and Geddes, Wright and
Frantz (2014). Appendix C describes these measures in greater detail. Broadly, regimes are classi-
fied based on criteria relating to political contestation and (with the exception of Cheibub, Gandhi
and Vreeland, 2010) electoral participation. The use of three alternative codings for electoral democ-
racy based on somewhat diﬀerent classification criteria serves as a robustness check, although the
correspondence between the three measures is quite high (see Appendix C for more details). As
these are country-year data, and my analysis is cross-sectional, I collapse the time dimension by
coding a country as an electoral democracy (autocracy) only if it remains a democracy (autocracy)
throughout the period 2004 - end of the dataset’s coverage. In other words, transition regimes are
excluded from the analysis below.
Figure 4 displays the distribution of LibDem for each of the three subsets of non-democratic regimes.
Recall that LibDem is standardized in the full sample to have mean = 0 and s.d. = 1. In these
subsets, the mean is substantially lower (between around -0.9 to -1.0), although we see that there is
still meaningful variation in the extent to which countries permit civil society and media freedom.
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Table 5: Enforcement Activity Excluding Electoral Democracies
Dependent Variable: Count of Implicated Individuals
Boix et al. (2012) Cheibub et al. (2010) Geddes et al. (2014)
(1) (2) (3)
LibDem 0.46* 0.62*** 0.48
(0.27) (0.23) (0.29)
Ti -0.44*** -0.34** -0.39***
(0.12) (0.15) (0.14)
Pop. (logged) 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.40***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Constant -4.53*** -5.04*** -3.38**
(1.37) (1.52) (1.58)
N 56 57 50
Log Likelihood -72.17 -78.06 -69.68
R2 0.136 0.129 0.099
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In fact, there are a handful of countries that score between 0 and 0.5 on LibDem, which corresponds
to roughly the degree of civic freedoms obtaining in countries such as Lebanon or Pakistan.
Next, I re-estimate the relationship between Enforce and LibDem, controlling for TI, for only
this restricted subset of countries. Given the small sample sizes, to reduce multicollinearity, I
include the log of population as the only control. Results are shown in Table 5. We see that, even
after excluding electoral democracies as defined by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012) and Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), greater media and civil society freedom is still significantly associated
with better accountability (models 1 and 2). If we restrict our attention to the smaller group of
autocracies as defined by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), the estimated coeﬃcient is still positive,
although the significance level falls just outside the 10% range. Importantly, the substantive size
of the coeﬃcients in all three regressions are very similar to those from Table 3, although we are
now considering only the least democratic countries in the sample. In other words, this analysis
suggests that even in countries where accountability cannot be reliably exercised through the ballot
box, a modicum of “democratic” freedom for the media and civil society can nonetheless help hold
corruption in check.
Conclusion
To summarize, this paper has investigated the relationship between democratic institutions and
horizontal accountability, defined as intra-governmental oversight exercised by the judiciary and
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other government bodies charged with monitoring and sanctioning corrupt behavior. Specifically,
this study focuses on the importance of liberal components of democracy - as embodied by a free
press and independent civil society - in supporting oversight agencies by reducing the transactions
costs facing these institutions. Empirically, I leverage qualitative information on anti-corruption
activities to construct an original dataset of horizontal accountability covering 154 countries over
the years 2004 - 2014. I find that, measured over the last decade, formal anti-corruption activity is
strongly correlated with media and civil society freedom across countries. Moreover, these results
hold even excluding “electoral” democracies from the sample, suggesting that even in countries
lacking vertical accountability, greater freedom in the civic sphere can nonetheless make a diﬀerence
in the fight against corruption.
These last results highlight the importance of studying prosecutors, the judiciary, anti-corruption
commissions and other law-enforcement agencies as sources of accountability. While much of the
literature focuses on accountability as exercised through the ballot, electoral mechanisms of corrup-
tion control may be imperfect for several reasons. For example, citizens may lack information about
malfeasance committed by public oﬃcials (Bauhr and Grimes, 2014; Chang, Golden and Hill, 2010;
Chong et al., 2015; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013), and even if citizens become aware of pub-
lic perfidy, corruption is simply one issue amongst many (e.g. partisanship, economic conditions,
etc.) that citizens must consider when deciding to support or punish a particular politician (Kon-
stantinidis and Xezonakis, 2013; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013). Finally, as previously
noted, electoral accountability can only be exercised every few years, and it cannot directly target
unelected public oﬃcials (Grimes, 2013). For these reasons, elections constitute a “blunt” and often
ineﬀective instrument for keeping corruption in check.
In this context, the everyday job of controlling corruption falls to formal oversight agencies. It is
therefore somewhat surprising that, until recently, relatively little research has sought to explain
variation in the activity and eﬀectiveness of these monitoring bodies (Alt and Lassen, 2008, 2014;
Lawson, 2009; Meagher, 2005; van Aaken, Feld and Voigt, 2010). I contribute to this line of schol-
arship by examining horizontal accountability from a comparative cross-national perspective, and
identifying the features of democracy that support anti-corruption enforcement by altering moni-
toring and sanctioning costs.
Second, in relation to the larger democracy literature, my results illustrate the importance of consid-
ering substantive aspects of democracy apart from elections in corruption research.10 As Coppedge
et al. (2011) argue, democracy can be approached as a multidimensional concept which encom-
passes aspects of civil liberties, checks and balances, direct participation, deliberation, minority
rights and substantive equality (c.f. Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). Elections may be key
10Of course, the ultimate choice between “thick” and “thin” measures of democracy depends on the research question
(Collier and Adcock, 1999).
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for controlling corruption, or they may be ineﬀective, or even counter-productive, but they consti-
tute only one dimension of a larger set of democratic rules and practices. My results suggest that
even in the absence of free and fair elections, eﬀorts to liberalize other aspects of the political system
(e.g. the media and civil society) can shape corruption outcomes by strengthening formal oversight
mechanisms. In this vein, additional research might fruitfully study how changes along alternative
democratic dimensions can aﬀect accountability and levels of corruption more generally.
Finally, this paper contributes empirically to the literature on governance and accountability by
introducing an original dataset of anti-corruption enforcement covering 154 countries over the decade
2004-2014. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first extant cross-national dataset that directly
aims to capture accountability outcomes (investigations, prosecutions, convictions, etc.), rather
than ultimate corruption levels. The measure thus fills a niche in the set of available governance
indicators, and has the potential to open up novel avenues for future research.
In particular, the empirical focus on anti-corruption enforcement introduced in this paper could be
usefully extended in several directions. First, due in large part to limitations in coverage in the
FITW reports, I was not able to construct a full timeline of the corruption cases included in the
dataset. However, one could, in principle, build a detailed case history of all of these cases from
newspaper reports that includes the timing of investigations, prosecutions and convictions, as well
as the the time lag between when a scandal first breaks and when it is finally resolved. This level
of granularity would allow scholars to more directly study the eﬃciency of oversight mechanisms,
as well as the determinants driving the progression of a case through the legal system.
In addition, a deeper analysis of this temporal dimension could yield interesting insights into global
trends in the fight against corruption: for example, has the rate of anti-corruption investigations
and prosecutions increased over time? Future scholars could also advance existing lines of research
addressing questions such as whether investigations are more likely to precede or follow leadership
transitions (Bågenholm, 2013; Bågenholm and Charron, 2014), or whether anti-corruption eﬀorts
are eﬀective in stabilizing a ruling regime (Fan and Grossman, 2001; Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991;
Lawson, 2009)? My ultimate hope here is that, by identifying a set of high-profile corruption cases,
this dataset can contribute as a springboard for future research.
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Appendix A: Country Counts of Implicated Individuals: 2004 - 2014
TI CPI Score
Count of Implicated Average: 2004 - 2014
Country Oﬃcials: 2004 - 2014 (scale reversed)
New Zealand 1 0.62
Denmark 1 0.67
Finland 1 0.73
Sweden 1 0.84
Singapore 2 0.84
Switzerland 0 1.11
Netherlands 0 1.28
Norway 0 1.35
Australia 0 1.36
Canada 5 1.44
Luxembourg 0 1.66
United Kingdom 4 2.00
Germany 1 2.03
Austria 3 2.07
Ireland 0 2.49
Japan 1 2.51
Belgium 0 2.67
United States 2 2.68
Chile 0 2.87
France 9 2.89
Uruguay 0 3.28
Qatar 0 3.49
Spain 5 3.51
Estonia 3 3.51
United Arab Emirates 0 3.66
Slovenia 3 3.75
Portugal 2 3.76
Israel 8 3.92
Cyprus 0 3.95
Botswana 2 4.09
Taiwan 5 4.15
Cape Verde 0 4.64
Oman 0 4.70
Bahrain 0 4.73
South Korea 7 4.73
Hungary 2 4.93
Mauritius 3 4.96
Jordan 2 5.04
Continued on next page
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TI CPI Score
Count of Implicated Average: 2004 - 2014
Country Oﬃcials: 2004 - 2014 (scale reversed)
Costa Rica 10 5.06
Lithuania 10 5.06
Malaysia 4 5.16
Czech Republic 7 5.27
Poland 3 5.30
Latvia 6 5.41
South Africa 5 5.45
Italy 3 5.47
Slovakia 1 5.50
Kuwait 2 5.54
Namibia 1 5.56
Tunisia 1 5.64
Turkey 0 5.79
Cuba 3 5.88
Greece 2 5.94
Croatia 2 5.96
Saudi Arabia 0 6.06
Ghana 3 6.10
Bulgaria 6 6.13
El Salvador 5 6.17
Montenegro 0 6.18
Rwanda 0 6.19
Brazil 4 6.24
Colombia 3 6.29
Georgia 1 6.35
Lesotho 2 6.35
Romania 10 6.37
China 10 6.44
Peru 8 6.44
Macedonia 1 6.45
Thailand 5 6.47
Serbia 0 6.47
Suriname 2 6.49
Panama 1 6.55
Jamaica 0 6.58
Morocco 0 6.59
Burkina Faso 0 6.63
Mexico 6 6.63
Sri Lanka 2 6.65
Senegal 3 6.70
India 2 6.71
Swaziland 0 6.71
Continued on next page
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TI CPI Score
Count of Implicated Average: 2004 - 2014
Country Oﬃcials: 2004 - 2014 (scale reversed)
Djibouti 0 6.85
Gabon 1 6.88
Malawi 6 6.91
Egypt 1 6.92
Algeria 2 6.96
Moldova 3 6.97
Mongolia 1 6.97
Benin 2 6.97
Madagascar 0 6.98
Liberia 3 6.98
Zambia 9 7.01
Tanzania 2 7.01
Albania 6 7.02
Armenia 0 7.03
Argentina 5 7.03
Dominican Republic 1 7.06
Mali 0 7.08
Guatemala 4 7.13
Lebanon 0 7.13
Bolivia 6 7.16
Gambia 0 7.20
Mozambique 2 7.22
Vietnam 1 7.24
Mauritania 1 7.27
Niger 3 7.30
Philippines 5 7.32
Ethiopia 2 7.34
Indonesia 22 7.35
Nicaragua 2 7.38
Syria 0 7.38
Uganda 0 7.39
Togo 0 7.39
Eritrea 0 7.43
Nepal 4 7.45
Belarus 0 7.46
Kazakhstan 2 7.46
Honduras 1 7.46
Ecuador 1 7.46
Iran 0 7.47
Comoros 2 7.50
Ukraine 1 7.52
Russia 3 7.56
Continued on next page
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TI CPI Score
Count of Implicated Average: 2004 - 2014
Country Oﬃcials: 2004 - 2014 (scale reversed)
Sierra Leone 0 7.59
Pakistan 4 7.60
Cameroon 3 7.67
Nigeria 8 7.69
Laos 0 7.69
Libya 0 7.69
Azerbaijan 1 7.69
Yemen 0 7.70
Paraguay 0 7.72
Kenya 3 7.75
Central African Republic 1 7.77
Cote d’Ivoire 1 7.78
Zimbabwe 2 7.79
Bangladesh 6 7.79
Congo 0 7.82
Kyrgyzstan 4 7.86
Tajikistan 0 7.88
Guinea-Bissau 0 7.90
Burundi 0 7.93
Cambodia 1 7.93
Angola 0 7.94
Venezuela 3 7.95
Guinea 1 7.99
DRC 0 8.01
Equatorial Guinea 0 8.10
Uzbekistan 1 8.16
Turkmenistan 0 8.18
Chad 0 8.21
Haiti 0 8.23
Iraq 0 8.28
Myanmar 1 8.40
Somalia 0 8.84
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics of Variables used in Regressions
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Enforce 2.27 (2.99) 0 22 154
LibDem 0 (1) -2.99 1.59 147
TI 5.97 2.05 0.62 8.84 154
Pop. (logged) 16.23 (1.51) 13.09 21.02 153
Insecurity 5.60 (2.43) 1 9.96 153
% Rural 0.43 (0.22) 0 0.9 153
% Protestant 0.10 (0.19) 0 0.98 147
% Catholic 0.31 (0.36) 0 0.97 149
% Muslim 0.25 (0.37) 0 1.00 149
British Colony 0.26 (0.44) 0 1 154
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Appendix C: Description of Electoral Democracy Measures
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). As explained on page 69, for a regime to be democratic,
both the chief executive oﬃce and the legislative body must be filled by elections. Contestation
occurs when there exists an opposition that has some chance of winning oﬃce as a consequence of
elections. This entails three features:
• Ex ante uncertainty: the outcome of the election is not known before it takes place.
• Ex post irreversibility: the winner of the electoral contest actually takes oﬃce.
• Repeatability: elections that meet the first two criteria occur at regular and known intervals.
In operationalizing the above features, a regime is classified as a democracy if it meets the require-
ments stipulated in all of the following four rules:
1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself popularly
elected.
2. The legislature must be popularly elected.
3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections.
4. An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent
to oﬃce must have taken place.
Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). As explained on page 6 of the codebook, democracy is
defined as a regime in which the executive achieved power through
a. A direct competitive election in which at least ten percent of the total population (equivalent
to about 40 percent of the adult male population) was eligible to vote; or
b. Indirect election by a body, at least 60 percent of which was elected in direct reasonably fair,
competitive elections (defined in the same way as for directly elected executives); or
c. Constitutional succession to a democratically elected executive.
In addition, elections are not considered reasonably competitive if
• One or more large party is not allowed to participate; and / or
• There are widespread reports of violence, jailing, and/or intimidation of opposition leaders or
supporters; and/or
• There are credible reports of vote fraud widespread enough to change election outcome (espe-
cially if reported by international observers); and/or
• The incumbent so dominates political resources and the media that observers do not consider
elections fair.
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Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012). As explained on pages 1530-1531, a country is defined as
democratic if it meets the following conditions for both contestation and participation:
1. The executive is directly or indirectly elected in popular elections and is responsible either
directly to voters or to a legislature.
2. The legislature (or the executive if elected directly) is chosen in free and fair elections.
3. A majority of adult men has the right to vote.
Table 7: Correspondence between Various Electoral Democracy Classifications
Cheibub et al. Dem = 0 Cheibub et al. Dem = 1 missing
Boix et al. Dem = 0 50 3 4
Boix et al. Dem = 1 4 76 1
missing 2 4
N overlap = 133
corr = 0.89
Geddes et al. Dem = 0 Geddes et al. Dem = 1 missing
Boix et al. Dem = 0 47 1 9
Boix et al. Dem = 1 1 75 5
missing 6 1
N overlap = 124
corr = 0.97
Geddes et al. Dem = 0 Geddes et al. Dem = 1 missing
Cheibub et al. Dem = 0 48 3 5
Cheibub et al. Dem = 1 1 73 9
missing 5 1
N overlap = 125
corr = 0.93
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